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Testing Theory and Debunking
Stereotypes:
Lawyers’ Views on the Practice of Law
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker, and Peter Mercer1
Part I: Introduction
There has been increasing scholarly attention paid to the composition of the legal
profession in various jurisdictions.2 A number of empirical studies have contributed
to an improving understanding of the changing composition of the profession as
a whole. It has been demonstrated, for instance, that the proportion of women in
the legal profession in North America has been steadily increasing and much important work has looked at the experiences of women in the profession.3 Various empirical studies have reported factors that influence the numbers of women in the
profession at different stages of legal careers.4
In 1996, this journal published a special issue on Legal Ethics. Included in that
issue, as well as a rich array of theoretical papers, was one describing an empirical
investigation of legal ethics that had created “a unique and exciting database that
contains lawyers’ actual descriptions of dilemmas they have faced in practice and
their analyses and responses to those dilemmas.”5 This article presents the final
fruits of the analysis of that database.6 In creating that study, the empirical investigators7 sought to provide answers to a number of questions:
1. What issues in the practice of law involve ethical decision-making?
2. To what extent do practitioners turn to the Handbook,8 to the Practice
Advisory Service,9 to senior members of the Bar, or to other sources in solving
ethical issues?
3. To what extent do these sources, particularly the Handbook, provide the assistance which practitioners seek in solving ethical dilemmas? To what extent
are they perceived to provide solutions? To what extent do they obviate the
necessity for ethical decision-making in favour of acceptance of perceived
authority?
4. To what extent, if at all, do factors such as age, gender, or the law school alma
mater of the lawyer affect his or her perceptions and actions in this area and
to what extent, if at all, are factors such as the size of the firm or geographic
location important?10
5. To what extent, if at all, do corporate counsel represent a unique population
in the legal profession in terms of issues or attitudes in the practice of law
involving ethical decision-making?11
The answer to the second question, demonstrated by this research and more fully
set out elsewhere,12 is that lawyers rarely turn to the text of their ethical codes to
solve problems they perceive in the course of their practices.13 The profession’s
ethical codes are one example of a formal information source, one that is externally
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validated by being made public or official. The finding that lawyers tend not to
consult their formal codes of ethics is completely consistent with the further finding
in this research that lawyers overwhelmingly tend to turn to informal sources of
information in problem solving, rather than formal sources.14 The code of ethics
is also created outside the lawyer’s law firm. Again, lawyers’ demonstrated reluctance to use it is consistent with the finding from this research that lawyers consistently prefer to search within the firm for information relevant to their
problem-solving, rather than going to sources beyond the firm, although this trend
was less demonstrable for lawyers from smaller firms.15
Having determined, in answer to the second question posed for this research,
that the ethical codes themselves are not widely consulted for decision-making,
the research also provides answers to the third question in that, even when consulted,16 codes of conduct are not often relied upon for ethical decision-making.17
Rather, as discussed by Michael Milde on the basis of the findings from this empirical research,18 lawyers appear to be engaged in an Aristotelian approach to solving
their dilemmas: looking to the “good” role models they identify amongst those practicing as sources of ethical behaviours.19
This research study used analysis of lawyers engaged in problem solving as a
lens to focus on professional ethics. The investigative method utilized the anecdote
interview, also known as the critical incident methodology, whereby the participating lawyers each selected a recent problem they had encountered in practice
and that situation formed the basis for the interview.20 This led the researchers to
rich, deep data based on the lawyers’ own experiences. Moreover, the researchers
were also able to demonstrate that the range of problems discussed by the lawyers
in the study is representative of problems occurring in the profession as a whole.21
The first research question asked what issues in the practice of law involve ethical
decision-making. Logically, rich data representative of problem-solving in the profession would contain incidences of ethical decision-making. Identifying such incidences in the data, however, led the researchers to focus on the crux of the second
and third research questions, and their focus on sources for problem solving: the
question at the end of the third research question: “To what extent do [the lawyers’
codes of conduct, practice advisory services, senior members of the Bar, etc.] obviate the necessity for ethical decision-making [by lawyers seeking solutions to problems] in favour of acceptance of perceived authority?”
The logic behind this final element of the third research question is that, insofar
as lawyers are acting upon the instructions of a perceived authority, they are not
acting as autonomous moral agents and are thus not engaged in ethical decisionmaking. This research has determined that the ethical codes of the profession are
not considered by members of the legal profession as either relevant or binding
in solving most of their dilemmas—but do lawyers rely on other perceived authorities to obviate the necessity of ethical decision-making? These researchers have
previously explored the possibility that the client might be one such authority, recognized by lawyers in such a way as to limit the ethical decision-making required
of a lawyer.22

Testing Theory and Debunking Stereotypes

167

Earlier preliminary analysis of these data has established a number of things.23
First, it established both that the issue of the lawyer’s role is directly related to
examination of the question of ethical decision-making in the practice of law and
that the issue of role is of significant concern to today’s practitioners. Second, that
lawyers do recognize a model of practice in which all decision-making is abdicated
in favour of the client’s wishes: a model identified in the literature as the “hired
gun” model. A contrasting model, in which the lawyer assumes a greater decisionmaking role, and thus can be more engaged as a moral agent, also is identifiable:
this model can be termed the “counselor” model. While these two roles have been
identified in literature about the legal profession as mutually exclusive, the preliminary findings from this research suggested that the majority of lawyers recognize a metamorphosis from the role of the lawyer as counselor to the role of the
lawyer as hired gun over the course of a single case. Finally, the evidence of the
interviews analyzed in the preliminary study of these questions was that, although
the role of the lawyer is a matter described and delineated in the code of conduct,
the issue of role is one determined by lawyers through factors other than either the
presentation of models in the legal literature or their ethical codes.
This analytic focus on the role of the lawyer as a vehicle for investigating questions relating to legal ethics has also permitted these researchers to capture evidence
on the three themes identified as worthy of empirical exploration when the project
was conceived:
I. to explore “whether in fact gulfs now exist between the norms of professionalism and the new realities of daily practice”;24
II. to examine “the goals of the legal community and the individual aspirations
of lawyers … to determine whether conflicts exist;25
III. to examine “the evolving nature of the solicitor/client relationship and the
legal profession’s obligations to society”.26
The preliminary study of the data involving role in this research establishes that
there is apparently a tension for a significant proportion of lawyers27 around the
nature of the solicitor/client relationship. In this context, the “goals of the legal
profession” and the “legal profession’s obligations to society” may be taken to be
represented by the Code of Professional Conduct.28 While in Ontario the legal profession has undertaken and represented the role of the Ontario lawyer in relation
to clients to be one following along a continuum from counselor to hired gun,
according to the progression of the file, or case,29 even the preliminary analysis
of the data from this study establishes that not every Ontario lawyer follows the
prescribed role path with every client—and, even in cases where the lawyer’s conduct mirrors the prescribed path, the lawyer can experience internal conflict and
stress as a result.30
The fourth research question asks whether factors such as gender31 affect the
lawyer’s actions in the area of ethical decision-making or whether the size of the
firm in which the lawyer practices or the size of the centre in which the lawyer
practices makes any difference. The previous analyses of the data have established
that the gender of the lawyer plays no part in how lawyers search for information
in solving their problems,32 nor in whether or not lawyers consult or rely upon their
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codes of professional conduct in solving problems.33 Nor does the size of centre
in which the lawyer works play any part in how lawyers search for information
in solving their problems34 or whether or not they consult the code of professional
conduct.35
The size of the firm in which the lawyer practices, however, was found to influence the extent to which lawyers prefer internal sources of information in problemsolving, with lawyers in smaller firms being more often inclined to seek external
sources, while still preferring internal, than those in larger firms.36 This finding of
predominant preference for internal sources is consistent with the relatively scant
use of the code of conduct by practitioners found, since, as mentioned above, the
code is a source external to the firm.37
Moreover, the fact that the use of the Handbook did not vary by firm size is consistent with the finding that the size of firm did not influence whether lawyers preferred formal or informal sources of information: all the lawyers preferred informal
sources of information—and, again, the Handbook being a formal source,38 it is
consistent that so few lawyers appear to use the Handbook in problem solving.39
It thus remains in this article to establish three conclusions to the research questions posed at the outset of this project:
(a) Related to the third research question, do the conclusions regarding the attitudes of lawyers towards their roles established in the earlier preliminary
study of the attitudes of the lawyers from outside the Metropolitan area also
hold true for those lawyers in private practice inside the Metropolitan area
and those lawyers practicing as corporate counsel?40 Does the evidence of
practice across the province in the full study confirm the preoccupation of
lawyers in private practice outside the Metropolitan centre with the appropriate nature of the solicitor/client relationship, the gap between the model
segue from counselor to hired gun in the Rules of Professional Conduct (the
governing statement of the legal profession in Ontario) and the individual
aspirations of lawyers and actual practice of law that was found in the preliminary analysis of this evidence?
(b) Related to the fourth research question, while it has been established in this
research that only the size of the centre in which the lawyer works has a significant effect upon the sources of information that lawyers use in problemsolving, is gender nevertheless a significant variable in the way in which
lawyers approach their roles?
(c) And finally, from the fifth research question: to what extent, if at all, do corporate counsel represent a unique population in the legal profession41 in terms
of issues or attitudes in the practice of law involving their roles?
The answers to these latter two questions are important, however, not so much
because they provide documentation or analysis of possible changes in the structure
of the profession but rather because of what they may tell us about whether the
emerging structure of the profession is fundamentally altering the practice of law.
Having demonstrated that lawyers’ views about the proper role of the lawyer may
be classified as exemplifying one or other of two classic approaches to the practice
of law articulated in the literature on legal professionalism (the lawyer as mentor
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or the lawyer as hired gun),42 in this article, these two roles will be identified with
two models of ethical decision-making that have been developed in the study of
moral development: the mentoring model of a lawyer’s role is identified in this
article with the care perspective and the hired gun model is identified with the rights
perspective. The authors then draw upon the evidence of their large study of Ontario
lawyers to discuss these models in light of several aspects of the emerging profile
of the legal profession. Finally, the article concludes with an exploration of various
explanations for the differences between the attitudes of lawyers that are documented in this study.
Part II: The Empirical Evidence
As mentioned above, this article is the final report of a research investigation based
upon data obtained through a project entitled Professionalism or Profit: The
Changing Nature of Legal Ethics.43 One hundred and eighty lawyers in large,
medium-sized and smaller firms or offices44 as well as sole practitioners, at four
different-sized centres in Ontario,45 were approached and asked to participate in
an interview. During the interview, each lawyer was asked to describe a recent incident of decision-making, involving any aspect of law practice, which she or he had
found to be difficult. The subsequent interview focused on probing and amplifying
the lawyer’s account of that incident. One hundred and fifty-four of those lawyers
interviewed (86%) consented to the use of their transcripts in the study. Of these
lawyers whose transcripts were included in analysis, 129 were lawyers in private
practice and 25 were corporate counsel.46
Although the sample of lawyers interviewed was not deliberately created to be
proportional according to gender in any way, interviews from women practitioners
represented 27% of those analyzed in the study and this corresponds directly to
the overall proportion of women practitioners in Ontario in the years surrounding
the data gathering for this study: in 1990 the percentage of women practitioners
was found to be 23% and in 1996 women were 29%.47
This study proceeded from the qualitative evidence provided through this openended interview process.48 The transcripts were analyzed and coded for patterns
and constructs.49 Forty-nine (32%) of the 154 participants whose interviews were
analyzed for the study raised the issue of their roles as lawyers in discussing their
problems in practice.50 The issue was also raised by just over a quarter (27.9%
or 36 of 129) of the private practitioners in the study. See Table A. On the other
hand, just over half (52% or 13 of 25) of the corporate counsel involved in the
study raised the issue of roles. This is a statistically significant difference demonstrating that more corporate counsel than might randomly be expected are concerned about their roles, whereas fewer lawyers in private practice raised the issue.
See again Table A.
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Table A:
Chi-square for Role & Location
(inside Toronto and outside Toronto collapsed to “Private”)
Location
Private

Corporate Counsel

Raised role

36
(41)

13
(8)

49

Did not raise role

93
(88)

12
(17)

105

Total

129

25

154

Role

Total

Chi-square = 5.603
degrees of freedom = 1
p = 0.018 (therefore significant at 0.05%)
(numbers in parentheses indicate expected values)
While fewer lawyers of all those in the study carrying on private practice raised
the issue of role when compared with the corporate counsel, further analysis demonstrates that it is private practitioners in the largest metropolitan centre who raised
the issue fewer times than expected: those in Ontario centres smaller than the
Metropolitan centre51 raised the issue as often as might be expected. See Table B.
Table B:
Chi-square for Role & Location
Location
Inside
Toronto

Outside
Toronto

Corporate
Counsel

Raised role

19
(24)

17
(17)

13
(8)

49

Did not raise role

57
(52)

36
(36)

12
(17)

105

25

154

Role

Total

129

Total

Chi-square = 6.324
degrees of freedom = 2
p = 0.042 (therefore significant at 0.05%)
(numbers in parentheses indicate expected values)
Table C reports the data from the study that of the forty-nine lawyers who raised
the issue of role in this study of 154 Ontario lawyers, it was the case that the issue
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of their role was raised by 38 male lawyers and 11 female. Proportionately, however, there was no significant difference between the number of male and the number of female lawyers in the study who raised the issue of role during their
interviews.52 The cell sizes in Table C make it impossible to determine whether
the apparent differences between the numbers of men and women who raised role
in Toronto, outside Toronto, or as corporate counsel are real differences or are
merely random effects of the sampling in this study.53
Table C:
Distribution by Sex and Location of Only Those Who Raised Role
Sex
Male

Female

Inside Toronto

18

1

19

Outside Toronto

11

6

17

Corporate Counsel

9

4

13

Total

38

11

49

Location

Total

Literature previous to this research project had suggested that the researchers
would find a dichotomy between those lawyers who saw themselves as hired guns,
strictly representing the views of their clients in the appropriate forums, and those
who saw themselves as mentors, guiding their clients to appropriate positions on
legal issues.54
The early analysis of the sub-set of the interview transcripts from outside Toronto
created in this study55 confirmed that one of these two distinct approaches concerning the lawyer’s role had been taken at any given time by each of those lawyers
in this study.
Part III: The Background Context
A. The Theory of Moral Development
For years, the dominant literature of moral development followed Lawrence
Kohlberg, whose theory was based solely on the response of 75 males.56 However,
in the 1970’s and 1980’s, several theorists began to challenge the existing models,
suggesting that moral development may differ in males and females. One of
Kohlberg’s most vocal critics was Carol Gilligan, his former student, who argued
that his model was based on male development, not human development. In 1982,
Gilligan published a book entitled In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women’s Development, in which she suggests that men and women have different
moral perspectives.57 According to Gilligan, morality can be approached from two
different perspectives. One perspective, which Gilligan characterizes as the care
perspective (also called the ethic of care), views human interactions as a web of
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interdependent relationships. Persons with this perspective view themselves as being
connected and interdependent on others. These persons focus on the outcome of
decisions—how actions will harm others, how seriously, and in what way the relationships with others will be affected. The other perspective, one Gilligan characterizes as the rights perspective (also called the ethic of rights), views human
interactions as a set of contractual relations. These persons separate themselves
from others and preserve relationships through a fair resolution of conflicts. What
is fair is fair as determined by rights, duties and appropriate rules.
Based on her empirical observations, Gilligan concludes that women most often
resolve dilemmas from the care perspective, while men resolve issues from the
rights perspective.
Gilligan’s theory, that there are these two different moral perspectives and that
one can be identified more closely with each gender, has not been accepted by all.58
Gilligan has received criticism for the methodology used in her studies.59 Even
accepting her methodology, she has been criticized for assuming that the differences
she has found empirically are the result of gender, rather than owing to other
factors.60 Gilligan has also faced criticism for presuming that her theory applies
to all women, regardless of social class, race, religion and ethnic group.61
Despite the criticism her theory has received, Gilligan continues to use gender
as a separate experimental category62 and remains very prominent in the area.63 The
question of whether or not gender is a factor in how people think and act remains
ambiguous, as subsequent studies have both supported64 and refuted65 her theory.
Although this study did not employ an experimental methodology which predetermined an examination comparing the rights and care perspectives among
lawyers, previous analysis of the views of lawyers conducted as part of this research
has established that lawyers’ views of their roles may be characterized as either
a hired gun or a mentor model.66 A review of the characteristics of the mentor and
mercenary (or hired gun) models taken from the literature of legal professionalism
demonstrates that lawyers who adopt the mentor role may also be taken to be working from the care perspective identified in the work of Gilligan and others, while
those lawyers who adopt the hired gun role may be said to be working from the
rights perspective.
In adopting the mentoring role, the lawyer must weigh competing and concurrent
third party interests, as well as those of the client, in order to decide how to advise
the client. The lawyer must consequently thoroughly weigh all available options
and encourage the client to be thoughtful in making the ultimate decision.67 This
involves the lawyer in responding to the actual individual needs and circumstances
of the client, whether or not those needs are articulated by the client. This emphasis
upon the interdependent relationships involved in the client’s situation and the multiple impacts possible from any particular client choice identify this role as one
essentially involving the care perspective.
From the hired gun, or mercenary, perspective, the lawyer is to act strictly as
the agent of the client. The role of the lawyer is exclusively to pursue the goals
identified by the client and follow the clients’ instructions explicitly. The lawyer
adopting this model of her or his role is under no duty to be certain that the client
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is acting reasonably in a given situation, but rather is under a duty only to ensure
that, insofar as the lawyer is acting for the client, her or his actions remain within
the bounds prescribed by law.68 This conception of the lawyer’s role naturally involves
a perception of the interaction of the lawyer and client based upon a contractual relationship. The adoption of this role permits a lawyer to maintain a perspective separate
from that of the client—to view the consequences of the client’s choices as consequences flowing from the system of law and justice. This is consistent with the rights
perspective. One of the themes of this article will therefore be to establish the relationship between the hired gun role or rights perspective and the mentor role or care
perspective for private practitioners in both large and small centres as well as for corporate counsel. A second theme of this enquiry will be to establish whether the distinction between the two roles or perspectives is gender-linked.
B. Gender and the Practice of Law
It has been predicted that there will be far-reaching social consequences in creating
a greater female presence in the legal profession. It has been suggested, for example,
that the presence of women may change the adversarial nature of the system, by
countering the adversarial process with a co-operative, non-adversarial approach
more attuned to women’s central concern with maintaining relationships.69 It is difficult to discern empirically whether such shifts in the practice of law are occurring.
This study contributes to that process of discernment by testing, in reports of the
actual practice of law, predictions that arise from Gilligan’s particular theoretical
perspective derived from empirical work in other contexts.
As one student of the law has said, “It seems that [Gilligan’s theory of] the different voice answers the question: What difference will women [in the legal profession] make?”70 If Gilligan’s theory that women most often resolve dilemmas
from a care perspective proves true for the practice of law, then the increased presence of women in the field can be expected to have profound social consequences
on the justice system in our society.
Proponents of this thesis conjecture that, by bringing the perspective dominant
within their gender to the legal profession, the increasing presence of women in
the profession will transform the very foundations of the legal system so that it
will demonstrate more concern for the needs of each unique person and a growing
emphasis on building and strengthening the relationships among individuals …
informed by the ethic of care, the law could become less individualistic and more
communitarian in its focus.71 This position is consistent, for example, with the argument made by Shaughnessy that “throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
many feminists have embraced, rather than rejected, gender differences. Women
have argued that their concern for human life, their purity and their moral sensitivity
equipped them to make a special contribution to public life.”72
To date, three studies have specifically attempted to predict whether this gendered distinction between the care and the rights perspectives can be detected in
the practice of law.73
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The first study was conducted in the 1980’s by Rand Jack and Dana Crowley
Jack, who interviewed 36 lawyers (18 male, 18 female) from a county in
Washington.74 In each interview, the lawyer was questioned about (1) her or his
general moral orientation, (2) her or his real life dilemmas, and (3) how she or he
would resolve two hypothetical dilemmas. In each of these three categories, the
researchers found that a majority of the women adopted the care perspective when
responding, while a majority of the men adopted the rights perspective.75
However, in looking at the response to a real life dilemma of one of the participants, there was a shift in his perspective when his client was less fortunate and
needed special attention. The participant went from a strong rights perspective to
a care perspective. The language used to describe the client’s needs was rights oriented, while the resolution sought fitted in with a care perspective.76 No shifts in
perspective-taking were seen when participants answered the hypothetical dilemmas
presented.77
A later study, involving seventy second-year law students in her income taxation
class, was conducted by Nina Crimm in 1994.78 One aspect of the study was to
determine whether the students, as prospective lawyers, had any automatic tendencies to incorporate either the morality of rights or the morality of care perspectives in their legal argumentation, and, if so, whether their choice of one or the other
followed gender lines. She also designed the study to include a component in
which the students attempted to provide proxy evidence to approximate the decision-making behaviour of judges. Data for both parts of the study were obtained
from the final examination in the income tax course through the analysis of the
answers to an essay question involving a moral dilemma presented in the context
of a hypothetical tax case. The results of the study indicated that there were no
significant differences between male and female tendencies to use the care or rights
perspectives.79
Most recently, Carla Hotel and Joan Brockman have conducted a study of 36
lawyers who predominantly practiced family law in Vancouver, British Columbia,
and the surrounding Lower Mainland area.80 Each lawyer in the study was presented
with a hypothetical situation designed to involve her or him in a discussion about
how she or he would deal with a client whose instructions were to proceed in a
manner that was not in the best interests of the child involved in the scenario.
Consistent with the findings of Jack and Jack mentioned above, Hotel and
Brockman found that a majority of the women responded from the care perspective
while a majority of the men responded from the rights perspective.81
Two of the above studies provide some support for the prediction that men and
women differ in their roles as lawyers although in both cases the lawyers’ responses
were based on hypothetical situations. The one study that looked at lawyers’ real
life dilemmas found that most of the lawyers interviewed possessed aspects of both
the care and the rights perspective, and that real life situations produce different
results than do hypothetical dilemmas.82 Therefore, whether male or female lawyers
respond from the rights or care perspectives in practice has not been established.83
This present study examines evidence taken from lawyers’ reports of their actual
experience of the practice of law and therefore can shed light upon the question
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of whether gender actually appears to influence the choice of a practitioners’ perspective (rights or care) on the role of the lawyer in the practice of law.
The work of Gilligan and others, and the results of two of the three studies in
law discussed above, would suggest that the male lawyers in this study should show
a preference for adoption of the hired gun or rights perspective model of the role
of the lawyer, while female lawyers should predominately demonstrate a care perspective through adoption of the mentoring or counseling model. Further, it would
be expected, based on these other studies, that more women lawyers than men who
reported having experienced conflict with their clients would have maintained a
counseling and mentoring attitude toward their clients. On the other hand, men who
had initially adopted a counseling model might be expected, when faced with a
conflict with the client, to make the transition to the hired gun role smoothly, rather
than either trying to stay with the counseling model or internalizing stress when
adopting a hired gun role. The women who had begun with a counseling model
and then moved to a hired gun role, on the other hand, again based on these earlier
studies, would be expected to exhibit signs of stress.
C. Practicing In-house versus Private Practice
As mentioned, one criticism of Gilligan’s work is that she focuses solely on gender
as the explanation for differences in perspective that she documents. In addition
to an examination of possible gender differences in determining lawyers’ attitudes
toward decision-making, this research will also look at two structural variables.
The first is the type of practice in which the lawyers are engaged.84
The perceived role of the corporate lawyer has changed over time—but has been
seen to be different from the role of the private practitioner.85 At the early inception
of the corporate-based practice, counsel focused on the needs of large companies
held a prestigious position.86 However, “[u]nlike accountants, who have been both
more integrated into companies and more mobile on its corporate ladders, in-house
lawyers are a relatively new development…”.87 Post World War I, in-house or corporate lawyers, had come to be referred to as “kept lawyers”,88 symbolizing the
perception of them as more dependent on their clients, who are in fact also their
sole employers, than is the case for those lawyers in private practice. With the development of the Masters of Business Administration and other business programs,
a business background became an increasingly desired attribute for success within
the corporate hierarchy. With the advent of this new breed of corporate executives,
the in-house lawyer’s status was perceived as declining.89 With that decline in status,
the compensation for the work also diminished.90 As a result, the corporate legal
department came to be viewed as the refuge for lawyers who did not succeed at
law firms.91 “Rightly or wrongly, corporate counsel have been seen by many law
firms as second-tier in-house legal advisors, good enough for the daily grind, but
not the big deals.”92
In even more recent years, there has been steady change toward yet another definition of in-house counsel. These lawyers are seen as an integral part of the running
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of the corporation—“redefining their role within Corporate Canada’s power structure and transforming the role of law departments from a support or service role
to that of a strategic business advisor … from pure service provider—on par with
other central service departments such as human resources, accounting and IT—to
an integral and respected part of the management team.”93 No longer do they do
only the simple legal tasks, rather they pick and choose the most interesting aspects
of the work available and hire outside law firms to pick up the overflow. The new
in-house counsel thus manage the company’s involvement with outside legal counsel. Furthermore, emphasis is also placed on preventive law practices. This means
that the in-house counsel is involved in the development of corporate planning and
goals and advises on legally sound approaches to achieving these goals. In-house
lawyers are also expected to use their legal expertise to predict possible future legal
trends in corporate regulation and how these trends will affect their client corporation. The corporate counsel solving these current and anticipated legal problems
is to keep in mind the corporate goals and present solutions that are consistent with
both the dictates of the law and the needs of the company. The overall role of the
emerging corporate lawyer is to manage the legal aspects of corporate life on a
day-to-day basis, not merely from a legal perspective but also from a more global
approach, integrating all they know about the corporation and its goals into the
process.94
The unique role played by in-house corporate counsel has led to different evaluations of the professionalism of these lawyers. On one view, a negative inference
can be drawn from the fact that there is seen to be the possibility of a blurring
between the actions of the client and its corporate counsel. Such a blurring, it is
argued, cannot occur in the relationship between private practitioner and client,
because, while the private practitioner only arrives on the scene after the legally
questionable incident occurs, the corporate counsel is privy to its development.95
On the other hand, a more positive spin is placed upon the relationship by the
“Inside Counsel Movement,”96 in particular, which distinguishes the service provided by the corporate counsel as being more ethical than that provided by lawyers
in private practice,97 in that such service takes into consideration all of the client’s
needs and plots a course of action that is in the best interest of the client.98 On this
view, counsel in private practice look primarily at resolving the legal question, not
necessarily considering the corporation’s other goals and how the legal solution
affects those goals. Both critiques reflect a critical evaluation of responses by corporate counsel to a role that is essentially perceived as the same, despite the differing
critiques: the role of the corporate counsel identified in both critiques is essentially
that of the mentor, reflecting the care perspective. By contrast, the private counsel
role reflected in both of these two critiques of the corporate counsel’s role seems
to postulate the hired gun, rights perspective.
It might be thought that in-house counsel would have a longer-term perspective
in helping and guiding their clients since they will remain at their companies after
any specific lawsuit is over. If the results of particular legal advice are detrimental
to the company, these in-house counsels will have to deal with the fall-out on a
day to day basis for some time to come. If an in-house counsel becomes unpopular,
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he or she may lose not only client but also job. Outside counsel, it might be thought,
do not have the same degree of involvement with their clients. If the legal results
are not optimal for all aspects of the client company’s goals, there is a very real
caveat on the private counsel’s work—that she or he did not know the inside workings of the client company and, beyond following the client’s instructions on the
specific legal situations involved, could not know the wider context within the client
company. As well, private “outside” counsel have other clients and are not working
on site. Thus private counsel will suffer less serious overall repercussions if not
all of a particular client’s goals and expectations are met. The very purpose of an
in-house corporate practice is to provide ongoing guidance and specifically to take
into account the corporate goals when solving a legal problem, to a greater extent
than a hired private counsel would.
Since the rights perspective is characterized by rights, duties and appropriate
rules and since corporate counsel are hypothesized to be more care oriented, it was
also postulated that they would be less likely than private counsel to cite the Code
of Professional Conduct and would be less satisfied to accept and apply its dictates.
Thus, given the literature and the unique position of corporate counsel, in this
present analysis corporate lawyers were expected to show more of a care perspective than private lawyers. Moreover, the expectation that corporate lawyers would
take a care perspective in their role led to the expectation in this study that the corporate lawyers would experience a significant level of distress if they were not able
to maintain that role and were forced to act the part of the hired gun. Conversely,
for private practitioners, who are hired when a client’s problem arises, the concept
of a hired gun would not appear to be as incongruous with their self-perceptions
as it would with those of the corporate counsel, and thus, in this study, private counsel were expected to exhibit a rights perspective on their roles. Moreover, the level
of distress experienced by the private practitioners when they are forced to take
on the hired gun perspective was expected to be lower than in the case of the corporate counsel.
D. Small Town Practice and Big City Practice
The second and final structural factor that the researchers in this study thought could
influence the role of the lawyer was the size of the centre in which the practice
was located. The sampling method used in the research was designed to provide
as geographically representative a picture of practitioners throughout the province
as possible. Ontario’s urban centres were classified into four groups based on population:
• Metropolitan centre:
• Large urban centres:
100,000 – 499,999 +
• Medium urban centres:
10,000 – 99,999
• Small urban centres:
1,000 – 9,999
Interviews were conducted in four geographically diverse locations: one metropolitan region, one large urban centre, and two medium urban centres.99
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Part IV: Findings
A. The Role of the Lawyer
Every one of the 49 Ontario lawyers in this study who discussed the role of the
lawyer in connection with her or his problem in practice described her or his starting
relationship with the client involved in the problem in language which identified
the relationship as a mentoring or counseling one. See Table D, first 3 rows.100
Table D:
Private practice3
Outside
Toronto1
N = 53

Inside
Toronto2
N = 76

Corporate
counsel4
N = 25

Total5

1 Total transcripts involving role

17 (32%)a

19 (25%)a

13 (52%)a

49 (32%)a

2 Hired gun role embraced

0

0

0

0

3 Counsellor role embraced

17 (100%)

19 (100%)

13 (100%)

49 (100%)

4 No conflict with client
(moved to ultimately agree
with lawyer’s counseling)

5 (29%)

9 (47%)

6 (46%)

20 (41%)

5 Conflict with client

12 (71%)

10 (53%)

7 (54%)

29 (59%)

6 Lawyer didn’t substitute own
judgment for client’s decision

12 (71%)

8 (42%)

5 (38%)

25 (51%)

7 Lawyer substituted own
judgment for that of client

0

2 (5%)

2 (15%)

4 (6%)

8 Lawyer withdrew from case

5 (29%)

2 (11%)

0 (0%)

7 (14%)

9 Lawyer didn’t withdraw from
case (moved to hired gun role)

7 (41%)

6 (32%)

5 (38%)

18 (37%)

10 Lawyer ultimately agreed with
client’s view (No stress)

7 (41%)

10 (53%)

6 (46%)

23 (47%)

11 Lawyer didn’t agree with
client’s view

5 (29%)

5 (26%)

5 (38%)

15 (31%)

12 No evidence of internal
conflict and stress

4 (24%)

0

1 (8%)

5 (10%)

13 Evidence of internal conflict
and stress

1 (6%)

5 (26%)

4 (31%)

10 (20%)

N = 154

All percentages are calculated of the “total transcripts involving role” (top row of table), except
the percentages in that row itself. See note a.
These percentages are calculated of that category’s total transcripts (N value).
see Figure 1
2
see Figure 2
3
see Figure 3
4
see Figure 4
5
see Figure 5
a

1
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Figure 1 illustrates the roles adopted throughout the problems they discussed by
the lawyers in private practice in the centres smaller than Toronto.101 The larger
typeface numbers shown on Figure 1 correspond with the numbers appearing in
the “Outside Toronto” column of Table D. The smaller numbers in parentheses in
Figure 1 indicate the breakdown by gender of each set of lawyers at each point
in this “tree” diagram.
Figure 2 illustrates the roles adopted by the lawyers in private practice in the
largest centre studied, identified in Table D under the column marked “Inside
Toronto”.
The private practitioners from all sizes of centre are represented in Figure 3,
combining the results shown in Figure 1 with those shown in Figure 2.
Figure 4 describes the roles adopted by the corporate counsel studied. The corresponding column of Table D is, indeed, labelled “Corporate counsel”.
Finally, Figure 5 depicts the roles described by all the lawyers in the study who
discussed role, thus corresponding to the column in Table D marked “Total”.
The fact, mentioned above, that none of the lawyers studied initially adopted
a hired gun approach to their roles is illustrated by the fact that the second row of
Table D has only 0 values in all the columns and by the fact that the top left corner
position in all five of Figures, labelled “Hired Gun Role embraced”, shows a 0.
One example of the mentoring role being adopted is the following:
The very difficult situation was to spend literally hours with the birth mother trying
to assist her with coming to terms with the court application for Crown Wardship
and adoption. And, bring her to the point where she, of her own volition, would recognize that it was in the best interests of the child that [it] not be placed with her,
which was her original request, to defeat the Children’s Aid Society application, but
rather to allow for an order, agree for an order of Crown Wardship …, at which time
the child would be placed with the foster parents. … There were a lot of tears and
a lot of agony. The process was extremely difficult. …
Interviewer: And you felt it was in the best interest of the child to go to the foster
home
I felt it was, but I have to be guided by my client’s instructions… and I certainly could
not suggest that this was what should happen if she did not agree… So we had some
counseling outside. We went to [city] together, she and I, to discuss and meet with
doctors who had cared for [it] when [it] was born, to address the physical needs [it]
would have. In an attempt to determine whether she could meet those needs
Interviewer: That was all on your investigating?
Yes. So eventually the order was made. … To process of getting from… my client
having been served with documentation to take away her child and her adamant opposition to that, to help her come around. I did not tell her what she was going to do,
she decided what she was going to do but it was a hard process.
Interviewer: …was … your stance that it would be in the best interest of the child?
That is not my determination to make in a situation like this. … Because she is my
client and I act on her instructions. But what I have to present to her is a range of
options. … it is very hard and until you have seen someone cry to the point where
their whole body shakes, their whole being, you think they will be torn apart, and
you know the pain. You can’t ignore that, that’s part of what you do. When you are
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a family lawyer, you are a counselor, you are a social worker, to a very limited extent
you are a financial advisor, you know, in terms of what people can do and can’t do.102

Having all embraced an initial counseling role,103 twelve (71%) of the counsel outside Toronto experienced resulting conflict with their clients (see the 5th row of
Table D104), whereas a much smaller percentage of both private practitioners inside
Toronto (ten, or 53%) and corporate counsel (seven, or 54%) experienced conflict
with the client at this point.
Finding themselves in conflict with their clients, none of the private practitioners
from outside Toronto substituted their own judgment for that of their client (see
the 7th row of Table D105) whereas two of the lawyers in private practice in Toronto
did this and two of the corporate counsel. This action effectively took these four
lawyers out of the role of counsel and into the role of surrogate for their clients.
Such a situation was described by one of the corporate counsel as follows:
…the tenant indicated that they would, not to us directly but through the mall management, that they would be emptying inventory from the store. And it was after six
o’clock in the evening and I was still here, myself and one other person. And they
actually started to empty the store. But I had to make this decision, and we chose
to go in and change the locks … I told him to change the locks and secure the guards.
… I would normally in a situation like that actually rely on what we call a “business
person” here, to make those types of ultimate calls. But every once in a while, I get
to do them myself. That’s the situation.
Interviewer: Now did you feel that you had the authority to make this decision?
Uh, Yes. I didn’t feel it in my capacity as a lawyer, but then my job here is much
grayer than just being a lawyer. I’ve been given a certain level of position where they
expect me to make certain business decisions. And that’s a hard thing to learn as a
lawyer, because lawyers don’t make business decisions—lawyers give advice and
let others make decisions. I specifically had been given a middle role. And I’m considered management, and I’m supposed to make certain decisions. In my capacity
as a lawyer, I still try to give all the advice and get all the input from what I call the
business people and the business units. But ultimately, I am given the authority and
the responsibility to make some decisions, actually quite a few on my own. … normally in a corporate counsel position you would get a vice-president or somebody
else to make that final decision as to whether to change the locks or whether to take
the risk to go in and seize the goods, which may be slightly illegal. I don’t necessarily
get that here. I sometimes make those decisions. And it’s acceptable for my company,
I don’t know if it would be considered acceptable from a legal sort of standpoint or
Law Society standpoint. My job is gray in that area.106

In all the cases of conflict but these four, where the lawyers remained in the role
of counsel, the lawyers either left the case or embraced the client’s instructions and
thus took on the hired gun role. As might be expected from the nature of their position, no corporate counsel were found who had left the case when a conflict arose
with the client (see Table D, 8th row107). In the position of corporate counsel, as an
employee, withdrawing from the case would probably have involved leaving their
employment, although no corporate counsel interviewed mentioned this possibility
in any aspect of their interview.108 On the other hand, in two cases involving private
practitioners in Toronto (11% of the nineteen cases involving role in Toronto) and
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in five cases involving private practitioners in smaller Ontario centres (29% of the
lawyers outside Toronto discussing role), the lawyers withdrew from the case rather
than adopted the hired gun role which would have required them to act against their
own personal views and act according only to their clients’ views.109
The lawyers who were in conflict with their clients’ views but decided not to
withdraw from the case were compelled then to take on the role of the hired gun
and take the instructions of their clients even though they disagreed with them.
This occurred in 18 cases: five times for corporate counsel (in 38% of cases), six
times for private counsel in Toronto (32%) and seven times for private practitioners
outside (41%). See Table D, 9th row.110
Moving down the right hand side of Figures 1 to 5, then, it can be seen that both
in cases where the lawyers never had any conflict with the client’s instructions
because the client embraced their counseling from the outset (see the 4th row of
Table D111) and in cases where the lawyers, after initial conflict with their client’s
instructions (because the clients did not adopt their counseling), then moved to
adopt the client’s position and behave as a hired gun, it is the client’s view of the
matter which prevails. However, while in some cases, despite their initial advice
to the contrary, the lawyers came to accept their client’s views (see Table D, 10th
row), in other cases, the lawyer, while acting according to the client’s instructions,
nevertheless continued to view the client’s instructions as inappropriate in the circumstances (see Table D, 11th row112). Those who had come to accept their client’s
views showed no signs of residual internal conflict or stress in their interviews about
these situations. The other two groups of lawyers who resolved their conflict with
the client and showed no signs of internal conflict or stress at the outcome of their
problems were the lawyers who had left their cases and the lawyers who had substituted their own decisions for those of their clients. These lawyers are shown in
Figures 1 through 5 at the middle bottom of each “tree” under “No internal conflict
or stress”.113 On the other hand, even where the lawyers did not ever adopt their
client’s views of the case, relatively few lawyers reported these problems in terms
that indicated residual internal conflict or stress: only one lawyer outside Toronto
but five (26%) in Toronto and four (31%) of the corporate counsel.114
Thus, at the end of the day, the clients’ view prevailed in terms of the outcome
of the case in 38 cases115 of the total 49 cases in which role was discussed:116 11
times out of 13 for corporate counsel117 (where, on the other hand, counsel substituted their own decisions in two cases, but never withdrew118), 15 times out of
19 for Toronto lawyers119 (where, on the other hand, lawyers withdrew in two cases
and in two cases the lawyer substituted his or her decision for that of the client120),
and 12 of 17 times for private practitioners in the smaller centres121 (where, on the
other hand, lawyers never substituted for their clients’ decisions but did withdraw
from five cases122).
These results, no corporate counsel withdrawing from any case and the incidences of corporate counsel substituting their own judgment for that of the client,
do provide evidence of a difference in attitude between corporate counsel and private practitioners. This difference was clearly articulated by one of the participating
corporate counsel:
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Typically when you’re an in-house lawyer, you’re expected not only to give an opinion and sort of leave it on the shelf, but take the client by the hand and say “well,
if you can’t do it that way, then understanding how this company does business, then
this is the way we can go about it, this is the proper way to deal with these issues.”
…To do a job well as an in-house counsel you have to be seen to, while being totally
professional and not being dragged into the business side, you have to be seen as a
facilitator as well. If you’re merely a gate-keeper and you say to someone “no, you
can’t do that,” then you’re not performing the function … I can’t speak that well to
private practice because I haven’t been in private practice for a long time, but I know
that what I do I’m expected to exercise the opinion of the lawyer, the judgment of
the lawyer, but at the same time facilitate the company doing business. If I merely
[give] an opinion, I say “you can’t do that,” people stop coming to you. So if you’re
someone who I know … usually … consults with me, …listens to what I say—I can
tell him “I think you should do it a certain way” but ultimately the decision will be
made by people, not playing the lawyer’s role, as to whether or not they take that
advice, just the way any lawyer advises a client. But the client doesn’t necessarily
take your advice.123

In these 38 situations where the clients’ view prevailed during the cases, the transcripts of the interviews revealed that the lawyers ultimately had differing views
about whether the clients’ views were correct. Indeed, in many cases, it was these
final considerations that led the lawyers involved to raise these particular cases
as the ones they wished to discuss with the research interviewers as their problem
scenarios:
It involved a decision as to whether or not to follow a client’s wishes. And I think
a lot of these things [problems in practice], you are going to find out, may involve
that kind of thing. … Because if I am aware of that particular situation [a potential
future problem stemming from the client’s idea] … I guess probably one of the most
important lessons from that is don’t get too involved in getting co-opted by the client.
And I had. … I guess that is about the most difficult decision that I have had to make.
… I guess the other thing it taught me was don’t listen to your clients, even though
you expect, or you know, or you feel that they know what they are talking about,
and you trust them, I think it is almost a maxim that your client can turn out to be
your worst enemy if you are not careful. … What he was asking was something quite
legitimate. …
Interviewer: So has this changed the way in which you deal with your clients in
general?
… I don’t do things clients instruct, even though they may sound terribly convincing,
and I don’t mean that to be as bald a statement as it sounds. If I get instructions from
the client to do something that I feel is in their best interest, and it is indeed in their
best interest, and there is no question, then I would proceed. If it is iffy, and contrary
potentially to the client’s best interests, but the client is insistent, then I either tell
the client to get other legal representation and decline to act, or I get it in writing
if it is something that is possible to live with.124

In situations where the lawyers and their clients disagreed but the lawyers ultimately
adopted a hired gun approach and acted for the clients, against their own views,
the lawyers in private practice outside Toronto seemed to accept the situation with
the most equanimity, showing no resultant internal conflict or stress in most such
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cases (4 out of 5). Four of five of the corporate counsel reported ongoing stress,
while all of the Toronto counsel reported stress over this role. However, when one
looks at the percentages of respondents involved, it is clear that the corporate counsel, in the end, exhibited the highest ongoing stress level with 31% of respondents
indicating internal conflict or stress remaining at the end of the resolution of the
cases they described. On the other hand, the most stress-free at the end of the processes described were the private practitioners practicing in the smaller communities
outside Toronto (6%). The private practitioners from within Toronto exhibited the
median-point of stressed respondents, but that point (26%) was closer to the stress
levels of the corporate counsel than to the private practitioners outside Toronto.125

Figure 1. The Role Taken by Lawyers in
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Of those seven lawyers who clung to the counselor role after coming into conflict
with the client to the point of actually leaving the case, six were men and only one
was a woman.126
Of the four lawyers who actually stepped out of the role of lawyer altogether
and usurped the decision-making function of the client, two were female corporate
counsel (the only two who chose, as corporate counsel, to substitute their judgments
for those of their clients127). Indeed, these two represent one half of the female corporate counsel interviewed who chose to discuss their roles as lawyers.128 Thus,
one half of the female corporate counsel challenged by their clients over their counseling role actually made the clients’ decision for them rather than continuing either
the counseling role or adopting the hired gun role. The third and fourth lawyers

Figure 2. The Role Taken by Lawyers in
Private Practice in the Largest Centre
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to have taken over the role of the client, rather than continuing the lawyer’s role
in either of its forms, were men in private practice in Toronto.129
The remaining 18 lawyers in the study who had experienced conflict with their
clients, and neither withdrawn from the case nor substituted their own decisions
for those of the client, chose to make the transition from mentoring role to hired
gun (see again Figure 5). This group included the remaining five corporate counsel
(see again Figure 1). In this role, three of the lawyers described coming to accept
the client’s position (2 private practitioners in smaller centres and one in Toronto,
derived from figures shown in Figures 2 and 3 respectively, but none of the corporate
counsel, refer to Figure 4) while 15 lawyers continued to disagree with the client’s
position, despite working within the client’s instructions (see again Figure 5).

Figure 3. The Role Taken by Lawyers in
Private Practice
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Part V. Discussion
The empirical evidence of this large scale study of the practice of lawyers across
the full range of practice settings demonstrates that the issue of their role is important to many practitioners. Fully one third of the lawyers, in this representative sample of the legal profession in Ontario, when asked to describe problems in practice,
raised issues involving their role.130
The data from this study also establish, however, that corporate counsel are significantly more concerned about issues of role than their counterparts in private
practice: over 50% of corporate counsel describing problems in practice raised

Figure 4. The Role Taken by Corporate Counsel
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issues of role. Thus corporate counsel do appear to constitute a distinct population
within the legal profession.
This study establishes further that there do exist in the practice of law two distinct
approaches to the lawyers’ role, identified in the literature of professionalism as
the mentor or counseling model and the hired gun or mercenary model. Moreover,
there are sound logical reasons for characterizing the former as an example of the
care model and the latter as an example of the rights model from the moral development literature.
Given their distinctive preoccupation with role, it was expected that the corporate
counsel would display a different pattern in terms of their approach to the role of

Figure 5. The Role Taken by Lawyers in
All Locations
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the lawyer than was exhibited by the private practitioners. However, all the practitioners, private practitioners in all sizes of centre and the corporate counsel, began
with the counseling role. Faced with conflict with the client, it is true that no corporate counsel chose to withdraw from her or his case rather than abandon the counseling role, whereas seven private practitioners did (32% of those 22 who
experienced conflict with their clients131). However, all corporate counsel did not
abandon the counseling role and adopt the hired gun role when faced with conflict:
two chose to move out of the role of counsel altogether and substitute their own
decisions for those of their clients. Although this was a higher percentage of lawyers
than in any other category (29% of the seven cases of conflict with the client), and
while no private practitioner in the smaller centres did this, two lawyers in private
practice in Toronto (20% of these lawyers facing conflict with their clients) made
this same choice. Finally, the corporate counsel appeared more often to suffer internal stress or conflict at the conclusion of the cases which had been problematic
for them than did the private practitioners (32% of those discussing role). However,
the private practitioners from the largest centre, Toronto, were a very close second
in this regard (26%).132
This research also indicates, therefore, that the question of the size of centre
in which the lawyer locates her or his practice has a direct bearing on that practitioner’s experience of the practice of law. Only 6% of private practitioners in the
smaller cities studied indicated that they experienced residual stress or internal conflict after the cases in which they had experienced problems were concluded, the
lowest percentage of any of the three groups of lawyers studied. Private practitioners
in Toronto were less concerned about their roles than were their counterparts in
private practice elsewhere (and, as mentioned, all the private practitioners were
less frequently concerned about their roles than were the corporate counsel). Those
in the smaller centres more often withdrew from cases in which they experienced
a conflict than occurred with their counterparts in the biggest city or the corporate
counsel. No one in the smaller centres chose to substitute his or her own judgment
for that of the client in a situation where conflict arose between the client’s point
of view and the lawyer’s counseling and yet both lawyers in private practice in
the largest city and corporate counsel did choose this route in a few cases.
It seems, therefore, that two aspects of the structure of the legal profession, private
practice versus in-house practice and practice in the largest metropolitan area versus
practice in smaller centres,133 create important variations in professional attitudes.
On the other hand, gender is not a significant factor in predicting whether
lawyers will be concerned about the issue of role in connection with their problems
in practice. And, despite some preliminary indications from other experimental
studies that suggested otherwise,134 this study reveals no evidence in the actual practice of law that the rights perspective, or hired gun model, is identifiable particularly
with male lawyers or the care perspective, or counseling model, with female practitioners. This finding is consistent with the earlier finding of this research that there
was no significant difference between male and female practitioners in their resort
to their professional code of conduct. Under Gilligan’s theory that the female-dominated care perspective involves more consideration of the outcome of outcomes,
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a relative harms analysis and a focus on ongoing relationships, rather than the
detached consideration of rule-based conflict resolution which is the hallmark of
the male-dominated rights perspective, one would have expected to see more male
lawyers looking to the largely rule-based135 code of professional conduct than female
lawyers.
Also contrary to the expectations of the research supporting the gendering of
the care and rights models in other contexts,136 in this study of the practice of law,
proportionately about as many men refused to abandon the role identified with the
care perspective, the counseling role, as did women lawyers. The expectation, based
on the Gilligan model, had been to find more women among those steadfastly refusing to give up the mentoring role. However, while eight men actually described
this experience (two substituting their own decisions and six leaving the case)
whereas only three women described this refusal to give up the mentoring role (two
substituting their own decisions and one leaving the case), the percentages are identical: 38% of men experiencing conflict with their clients (21) and 38% of women
experiencing conflict with their clients (8) chose roles that did not require them
to adopt the hired gun role (avoiding switching to the rights perspective).
With respect to the lawyers in this research who, by moving to the hired gun
model, continued to follow the clients’ instructions while continuing to disagree
with the clients’ positions, Gilligan’s work led to the expectation that the majority
of those who described experiencing internal stress would be women, since the
men would be expected to accept the new role as dictated by the system. However,
in this study, more male lawyers described continuing stress, internalized after the
new hired gun role was adopted (9 of the 30 men who adopted the hired gun role
during the cases they described (30%) and only 1 of the 8 women who described
adopting the hired gun role during the cases they discussed (12.5%)).
In the larger context, these findings may have several consequences. It may be
that there are no legitimate gender differences between men and women, in moral
perspectives or in problem-solving techniques or in development of professional
roles. This would be in line with the modern feminist perspective that there is no
intrinsic connection between nature and women.137 On the other hand, this study
may be inconclusive on that point because it can be argued that women lawyers
are not representative of women in general: perhaps by entering the profession of
law, women are entering into a traditionally male world where they must behave
in a masculine fashion in order to excel and this study merely gives evidence of
the success of that adaptation. The research of others has shown that women who
attempt to enter spheres that are traditionally masculine are required to adapt to
the norms of the masculine culture and even to out-man the men.138 Certainly, in
this vein, this research would bolster, for law, the argument made by Harding, in
the context of women in science and technology, that increasing numbers of women
will not necessarily alter the masculine character of a profession.139 This ambivalence of interpretation is prevalent in the pattern of research arising from the feminist movement: one branch argues that there are no provable differences between
men and women, the other branch embraces those differences.140
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Whatever one’s perspective on the reasons behind the character of the legal profession,141 this research study, mirroring, as it does, the actual voices of the men
and women practicing law in the mid-nineties, does not provide any support for
the contention that the presence of women is creating a “softer voice” in the profession. In fact, in this data, the men were just as likely to question their roles as
lawyers and to respond by clinging to a mentoring role, the care perspective, as
the women.
These findings of this research are particularly important because they illustrate
what is actually happening in the legal profession.142 They demonstrate that lawyers
do rely upon perceived authority to obviate the necessity of ethical decision-making
to a large extent. However, they do not often rely upon the authority of the professional code of conduct. They much more frequently rely upon the instructions
of the client as the case progresses. However, reliance upon the instructions of the
client, as the case progresses, is completely in harmony with the dictates of the
profession in which these lawyers are working. No lawyer was found who began
the relationship with the client in a hired gun mode. Although most lawyers, in
the end, relinquished their decision-making to their clients’, this transition from
counselor to hired gun, mandated by their professional obligations, was one fraught
with challenge for many lawyers. Lawyers resolved their problems in these areas,
not by resort to official sources such as their code of conduct, but by resort to internal, informal sources of information such as mentors (although more lawyers in
smaller firms did use external, but still informal, sources than in the other practice
settings). Indeed, some lawyers in every type of practice refused to accept their
client’s decision as binding upon them and refused to make the transition from
counselor to hired gun. (How they avoided making the transition is one of the key
indicators of different attitudes to the practice of law depending upon the aspect
of the structure of the profession in which the lawyer was practicing.)
This research demonstrates, therefore, that, while the majority of lawyers do
follow the professionally dictated path from mentor to hired gun and thus parallel
the published professional norm, the reality is that a significant proportion withdraw
from cases or even substitute their own decisions for those of their clients instead
of bowing to the will of their clients in cases of disagreement. While demonstrated
in only a few situations, the evidence that some lawyers will substitute their own
decisions for those of their clients must be a concern for the profession since it is
evidence of a divergence between the individual aspirations of such lawyers and
the overall goals of the legal community to represent, but not substitute for, clients.
Finally, this research amply demonstrates that, although lawyers do not often refer
to the formal, external documentation of their codes of ethics, lawyers are preoccupied with the constant tensions of specific solicitor-client relationships and the
lawyer’s overall obligations to society.
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the Metropolitan area. See Wilkinson, Mercer & Strong, “Mentor, Mercenary, or Melding”, supra
note 6. The results reported in that study are here reported in the “Outside Toronto” column of
Table D.
101. This Figure represents the same data as is reported in Figure 11 of the preliminary study reported
in Wilkinson, Mercer & Strong, “Mentor, Mercenary, or Melding”, ibid. at 418, although the
diagram has been drawn slightly differently in order to show direct comparison in this article
with the findings regarding the corporate counsel and lawyers in private practice within the
Metropolitan area, Toronto. Specifically, although no lawyers in the smaller centres reported
this, a branch has been added to indicate the possibility that the lawyer substitutes her or his own
judgement for that of the client.
102. Lawyer F (corresponding with the identification in Wilkinson, Mercer & Strong, “Mentor,
Mercenary, or Melding”, supra note 6).
103. Shown on the right hand branch of the first branching in Figures 1, 2 and 4.
104. The elements of row 5 of Table D are shown on the right hand branch of the second branching
in Figures 1, 2 and 4.
105. And, correspondingly, the left hand branch of the third branching of Figures 1, 2 and 4 (the 3rd
branching appears toward the middle of the right hand side of each of these figures).
106. Lawyer No. 118.
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107. This is illustrated in the right hand branch of the fourth decision branching in Figure 4: compare
with the private practitioners depicted in Figures 1 and 2.
108. Toward the very end of the interview with Lawyer 129, for example, the Interviewer gave a
prompt which might have led to such a discussion but instead led to a different, very interesting
exchange about the identity of the corporate client:
Interviewer: But the client is also your employer.
Really, it is. That’s right. The question is who’s your client? If the client’s the company,
but the company only exists [as a] legal fiction. I look at the clients as the physical people
who are trying to represent the company’s interests. When I talk about risks for the company, I am keeping in mind the obligation of the company to its shareholders. … So when
you are [asking] who’s your client, you are always engaged in a difficult analysis. I can’t
view the individual who is sending me something, a problem to look at or a situation they
want to have advice upon, that individual’s not the client. Yet you deal with these people
all the time and there’s not really a conflict, but a balance to be struck all the time between
the fact that you’re trying to serve that person and help them get their job done, but underlying it is serving the larger … corporation. … where I’m advising on things like dismissals, the company’s reducing work force … I’m always thinking, what’s the balance
between the company paying the minimum [and] what’s fair to take into consideration
for that particular employee. … So I think either explicitly or implicitly you’re balancing
these various interests. I mean, if somebody asks me “what’s our obligation to disclose
something?”, I’m thinking what’s our obligation to our shareholder, what’s our obligation
to the securities legislation, what should we be advising our directors to do? It’s not clear
cut. You’re not an advocate in the pure sense.
In one other case, the lawyer raised the question indirectly, at the tail end of the interview, when
discussing his current role as opposed to a previously held position:
So [the fellow employee of the former corporate employer] was putting me in this very
awkward position of either I do it for him because he’s right here and I might lose my
job if I don’t, or I you know, offend him, maybe ultimately lose my job, but answer to
who I actually reported to [rather than the employee requesting]. … And I was a first
year lawyer, and it was an awful conundrum … I don’t consider that a real decision except
as to a personal decision … I chose to handle it like the typical first year scared lawyer,
and I found my immediate supervisor who was a lawyer. [Lawyer No.118, in an aside]
109. As is evident from the following transcript, the threat to withdraw from a file is not made lightly
by counsel in private practice and is made in full knowledge that, while it might not mean dismissal as is perhaps a possibility in the case of the corporate counsel, it can have direct financial
consequences for the firm and, indirectly, for the future of the lawyer involved:
This particular client wanted me to do something that I felt was improper and I expressed
it to him, and he was quite upset. In fact, he was yelling at me and telling me he was disappointed. … But I told him I just couldn’t do that and maybe he could find some other
lawyer to do what he had asked me to do. … And again he was quite upset, and when
he hung up the phone I went to the senior partner and I said “I think I have just blown
the big client” and explained to him the situation. And, fortunately for me, the senior partner said, “You have done the right thing, and we’ll see what the outcome is.” And believe
me, I lost sleep over it. This is a substantial client; this is somebody who demands things
to happen and usually gets them done. [Lawyer A]
110. This change in the lawyers’ roles is illustrated in Figures 1 through 5 by the diagonal reaching
up from the lower right hand side of each figure, beginning at the left hand branch of the 4th
decision juncture and ending back at the upper left of each figure where the “Hired Gun Role
embraced” is labeled.
111. The lawyers in this position are shown in Figures 1 to 5 on the left branch of the 2nd branch,
“Conflict with Client?” then moving in a downward diagonal across to the left hand side of each
figure, flowing into the number shown for “Client’s view of the matter prevails”.
112. These two sets of lawyers are shown on the right and left branches, respectively, of the first branch
in the lower left of each of Figures 1 to 5.
113. It may be noted that although none of these lawyers indicated any residual conflict or stress over
the outcome of these cases during the interviews, these are all cases raised by these lawyers as
recent problems in their practice which they wished to describe when asked by the interviewers
for this research to choose a significant recent problem in their practices on which to base the
interview. Thus, although there was no reported stress or conflict involved in these outcomes,
developing the solutions to these problems had been involved enough to flag them to the participants as worthy of discussion in this research. Lawyer No.118, for example, who has been
quoted above, commented as follows:
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But I mean I can’t say that anyone sat here overnight worrying about it. …
Interviewer: Were you able to discuss it with anybody?
Actually that was why I picked that particular situation [to discuss in the interview], No.
… It was quite a strange day. I had one other person that I was working with … And she
was relying on me completely from the perspective of what are we allowed to do and
what are we not allowed to do…. At the end of the day, I’m more senior than she is in
position, so I have to make the decision. … And so I made an executive decision and
went with it.
Lawyer F, quoted above, after describing the counseling role in a custody case, commented as
follows:
Interviewer: … what exactly was the difficult decision for you?
Whether or not I was making the right decision in trying to educate my client about what
she was looking at in the future; should she pursue the instructions which she originally
gave me? That was my hard decision to make, do I accept it and just say blindly, “let’s
go ahead and litigate this”, or do I try and inform her? And my decision was to inform
her, at least then it would be an informed decision.
114. See Table D 13th row and the right hand branch of the last branching on the lower left hand side
of Figures 1 to 5.
115. See left hand side of Figure 5 “Client’s view of the matter prevails.”
116. See top value in Figure 5, labeled “Client arrives.”
117. See left hand side of Figure 4 “Client’s view of the matter prevails.”
118. See right hand side of Figure 4 at third branching and fourth branching respectively.
119. See left hand side of Figure 2 “Client’s view of the matter prevails.”
120. See right hand side of Figure 2 at third branching and fourth branching respectively.
121. See left hand side of Figure 1 “Client’s view of the matter prevails.”
122. See right hand side of Figure 1 at third branching and fourth branching respectively.
123. Lawyer No.129
124. Lawyer No.86
125. See again Table D 13th row.
126. See again toward the lower right side of Figure 5.
127. See again Figure 4, right side.
128. See again top of Figure 4.
129. See again Figure 3, right side.
130. This issue was the largest single common thread found by the researchers in the 154 transcripts.
131. However, it must be noted that there was a split in this regard between private practitioners in
Toronto, who only withdrew from cases where there was conflict with the client in 20% of cases,
whereas in the smaller centres, conflict with the client led the private practitioners to withdraw
in 42% of cases.
132. Indeed, it will be recalled that in fact the corporate counsel were from the same large city, so
perhaps this is a strong validation of the anecdotal evidence that practice in smaller centres is
less stressful—with only 6% of practitioners from the smaller centres ultimately giving evidence
of internal stress or conflict.
133. Whereas analyses in this research of the sources of information used by lawyers in problem solving and specifically the use of the code of conduct by lawyers demonstrated that differences
between private practitioners depending upon the size of firm in which they practiced were not
significant.
134. As discussed above, Jack, Moral Vision, supra note 74 and Brockman, “The Use of SelfRegulation to Curb Discrimination and Social Harassment in the Legal Profession”, supra note
2 were studies based upon hypotheticals that suggested differences would be found whereas
Crimm, “A Study”, supra note 78 had found no differences.
135. See Robinson, “Ethical Evolution”, supra note 28.
136. See Shaughnessy, “Gilligan’s Travels”, supra note 69 and Gilligan, “Reply by Carol Gilligan”,
supra note 64.
137. See Rosemarie Putman, Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed.
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
138. See Frances K. Conley & Delese Wear, Privilege in the Medical Academy: A Feminist Examines
Gender, Race and Power (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1997); Frances
K. Conley, Walking Out on the Boys (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1998).
139. See Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1986) at 21.
140. See Shaughnessy, “Gilligan’s Travels”, supra note 69 at 9.
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141. See C.J. Wydrzynski, L. Chartrand, M. Cormier, D. Eansor, K. Hildebrandt, H.L. O’Brien and
D.J. Blonde, Selecting and Educating Lawyers for a Changing Society: A Comparative Study
of Admissions, Law School Environments and Careers of Law Graduates [Report to Funding
Agencies] (n.p., March 2000). See also the subsequent publication from the report: Larry N.
Chartrand, Dolores J. Blonde, Michael Cormier, Kai Hildebrandt, Christopher Wydrzynski &
Edward J. Czilli, “Law Students, Law Schools, and their Graduates,” (2001) 20 Windsor
Yearbook of Access to Justice 211. The study examined five law schools (University of Windsor,
University of Western Ontario, Université de Montreal, Dalhousie University and University
of Alberta) roughly during the period 1992-1995, surveying students and alumni. This large study
focused on variation between schools in their admissions policies and the effects of the changing
composition of law students (in terms of such factors as age, gender and race) on attitudes toward
such matters as legal education, careers and law practice. The study focused on the effects of
increased multiculturalism in the legal profession as being at least as important as the effects
of the increased numbers of women in the profession.
142. As opposed to the previous studies canvassed above in relation to both ethics and gender in the
legal profession which relied upon hypothetical situations in their research methodologies. On
gender alone, see, e.g., the Rights and Responsibilities Study in Gilligan, In A Different Voice,
supra note 57. On legal ethics and gender, see, e.g., Crimm, “A Study”, supra note 78 and Hotel
& Brockman, “Legal Ethics in the Practice of Family Law”, supra note 80.

